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average person thinks in terms of legal consideration, but it
is equally foolish to contend that he makes no distinction be-

tween a gratuitous promise to give and that which may in
effect become a lien on his possessions. For most people
the moral obligation engendered by the subscription may well
disappear if circumstances change unexpectedly.27
The factors which have actually influenced the courts to
decide against the charity in the few modern cases which
have reached that result 8 can only be conjectured. 29 Yet the

methods. of big business have moved into the field of charities. The magnitude and pressure tactics of these -operations warrant reconsideration of the public policy which has
accorded to charitable subscriptions a preferential position
in the law.

FEDERAL COURTS
EFFECT OF STATE STATUTE ON JURISDICTION OF
FEDERAL COURTS
A Tennessee corporation acted in Mississippi as realty
agent for a Mississippi resident, without having, qualified to
mentioned here only because it does have a substantial bearing on the
strength of the moral obligation. A person who believes that he is
making a conditional promise certainly does not feel as great a moral
obligation as the person who knows that he is making a binding contract.
27. As pointed out supra note 18, Yale University did not even
contact those who did not pay their subscriptions during the depression
of the 1930's.
28. American University v. Todd, 39 Del. 449, 1 A.2d 595 (1938);
American University v. Conover, 115 N. J. L. 468, 180 Atl. 830 (1935);
Floyd v. Christian Church Widows and Orphans Home, 296 Ky. 196,
176 S. W.2d 125 (1943).
29. In American University v. Conover, supra note 28, as well as
in the principal case, there was present both an "implied promise"
of the organization and the recited promises of others. The decisions
in both cases clearly imply that the courts did not believe these factors
to constitute consideration capable of supporting a contract. In each
case the court took care to point out that there was no evidence that
the organization had taken any substantial action in reliance upon
the subscription despite the general allegations of reliance, which had
been held sufficient in previous cases. This would seem to indicate
that the courts are tending to be less liberal in finding consideration
for charitable subscriptions. However, no recent American case has
been found where a charitable subscription has been held unenforceable solely for want of consideration while the subscriber was still
living. Since the subscription has always been considered in contract
terms whether the subscriber has died should make no difference.
But it is possible that the courts are influenced by the policy of the
Wills Acts and hence are more critical toward so-called contracts
which resemble testamentary dispositions.
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do business in Mississippi as required by statute.'

Upon

the Mississippi resident's failure to pay the corporation its
brokerage commission, the corporation brought an action in
the United- States District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi. Federal jurisdiction was grounded upon the
diverse citizenship of the parties. The district court dismissed the action, ruling that the realty corporation's noncompliance with the Mississippi statute rendered the contract
void. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.
It held that the Mississippi statute was jurisdictional and
made the contract unenforceable in the courts of the state,
but that the statute was without effect upon the jurisdiction
of the federal court.2 Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d

701 (5th Cir. 1948). On rehearing, the judgment for tle
corporation was reaffirmed, despite the argument that the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Angel v. Bulling-

ton3 compelled the federal courts to refuse to entertain the
1. MISS. CODE ANN. (1942) §§ 5319, 5339, 5343.
2. "The general rule is, that a statute which merely closes the
courts of the state to a non-complying foreign corporation doing business within a state, and which does not expressly or constructively
declare the contract void, does not prevent the maintenance of an
action by such foreign corporation in a federal court sitting in that
state. . . . This 'would not be true if the contract were void in the
state where it was executed." Peter & Burghard Stone Co. v. Carper,
96 Ind. App. 554, 572, 172 N. E. 319, 325 (1932). See David Lupton's
Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U. S. 489, 496 (1911);
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Kane, 117 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1941);
8 THOIPSON, CORPORATIONS § 6672 et seq. (3d ed. 1927); Note, 133
A. L. R. 1171, 1172-1183 (1941).
3. 330 U. S. 183 (1947).
Bullington, a citizen of Virginia, had
sold Virginia land to Angel, a citizen of North Carolina. For the
unpaid balance of the purchase price, Angel executed notes secured
by a deed of trust on the land. The trustees sold the land upon default on payment of the notes. An action for the deficiency was brought
by Bullington in the North Carolina courts. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina reversed a judgment for Bullington entered in tlme
court below, ruling that the action was not maintainable because of a
North Carolina statute which prohibited the recovery of deficiency
judgments in the circumstances. Bullington recommenced his action in
a North Carolina federal district court. A judgment for Bullington
was affirmed by the court of appeals, but reversed by the
United States Supreme Court in an opinion which has given rise to
a great deal of confusion. Apparently the decision rests upon two
grounds: 1) In the state courts, questions involving the contracts,
privileges and immunities, and full faith and credit clauses of the
Federal Constitution might have been decided. But they were avoided
by the state court's holding that the North Carolina statute had only
the effect of closing the courts of the state to deficiency claims. In
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view, these constitutional claims were reviewable upon appeal from the adjudication of the North Carolina Supreme
Court. Because Bullington forewent such an appeal, the North Carolina judgment was declared to be res judicata upon the issues raised
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corporation's action. Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 170
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1948). 4
Since the decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins 5 made state
law the lodestar for federal courts sitting in diversity cases, 6
the rule of that case has been invoked repeatedly to extend
the domain in which state law is to guide. The Supreme
Court has said that the rule of the Erie case requires federal
obeisance to state rules of conflict of laws,7 state statutes
of limitations, 8 state notions of public policy, 9 and state
rules allocating the burden of proof. 10 rn the recent case of
Angel v. Bullington, it was open to the United States Supreme
Court to answer another question-the question posed by the
instant case-by deciding whether or not, under Erie principles, federal courts in diversity cases must close their doors

to suitors where state courts have refused to take jurisdiction."

Much in Angel suggests that a state's determination

by Bullington in the federal district court. 2) The North Carolina
statute withdrawing jurisdiction from the courts of the state is expressive of state policy, and so is controlling upon the federal court,
under the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. Mr. Justice Reed, in dissent, conceiving that the opinion of the Court was grounded upon
res judicata, stated that that doctrine had been misapplied by the
majority. In a separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge
announced tht he, too, found the prevailing opinion's use of res judicata
a novel one. Justice Rutledge criticized, too, the Court's mixing of
the two reasons for decision, either one of which if valid would have
been sufficient to support the result.
4. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has recently
held that the Illinois statute prohibiting the importation into
that state of wrongful death actions has not the effect of closing the
doors of the federal courts in Illinois to a plaintiff suing on a cause
of action which arose in Missouri. Judge Major cited the principal
case as one buttressing his conviction that anything said in Angel v.
Bullington respecting the efficacy of state jurisdictional statutes to
limit the jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity cases was entirely
argumentative. Davidson V. Gardner (two cases), 172 F.2d 188 (7th
Cir. 1949).
5. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
6. The decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins has been said to compel
application of state law in diversity cases where a failure to apply
it would produce a substantial variance in the outcome of the case.
See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 192 (1947); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109 (1945); Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193,
195 (2d Cir. 1945). It must be understood throughout the discussion
which follows that reference to the duty of federal courts to follow
state law is pertinent only to cases arising under diversity jurisdiction.
7. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
8. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
9. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941).
10. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939); of.
Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940).
11. To say that the question in these cases is one respecting the
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respecting the jurisdiction of its own courts is binding upon
the federal courts. 12 But the majority's reliance, as well,
upon principles of res judicata so obscures the reasoning of
the Court that confident interpretation of Angel v. Bullington is impossible." Lower federal courts, in consequence,
are now at pains to learn to what extent, if at all, the opinion
4
in Angel relies upon the principles of Erie..
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins was the rejection of a system
which offered an out-of-state plaintiff opportunity to select
whichever of two available tribunals afforded him the more
advantageous rules.' 5 In terminating the pre-Erie system
of two bodies of law operating within one state, the United
extent to which a state may "bind" a federal court is to overlook the
fact that the decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins was no more than an
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act. REV. STAT. § 721 (1875),
28 U. S. C. § 725 (1940). Since this is true, application of state law
by a federal court in a diversity case follows as a result of adherence
to the authoritatively construed mandate contained in a federal statute,
and not as a result of a subjugation attempted to be imposed by the
state legislature and courts. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183,
210 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
12. Prior to the Erie decision, it had been held that a state could
not, by closing the doors of its courts in certain cases, limit in like
manner the jurisdiction of the federal courts hearing diversity cases
in the state. David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America,
225 U. S. 489 (1911). The per curiam opinion filed upon rehearing
of the instant case manifests the court's conviction that the David
Luptons' Sons Co. case is, nothwithstanding Erie and Angel, expressive
of the going rule respecting the ability of a state to limit by its own
jurisdictional statutes the jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity
cases. The same opinion has, in effect, been expressed in the Seventh
Circuit. See Davidson v. Gardner (two cases), 172 F.2d 188 (7th
Cir. 1949); Stephenson v. Grand Trunk W. R. R., 110 F.2d 401, 405
(7th Cir. 1940). But see note 14 infra.
13. An excellent note treats the mixed grounds of decision in
Angel v. Bullington. See Note, State Statutes Depriving State Courts
of Jurisdiction as Affected by the Rule of Erie v. Tompkins, 56 YALE
L. J. 1037 (1947).
14. In the course of the opinion in Angel v. Bullington, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said: "Cases like David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile
Club .

.

. are obsolete insofar as they are based on a view of diversity

jurisdiction which came to an end with Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins."
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 192 (1947). If the conclusion contained in the passage is a necessary part of the decision, Angel is, it
seems, properly regarded as decided in part on Erie principles.
15. The federal diversity jurisdiction had, by the time of Erie,
become a vehicle for discrimination against residents of the state in
which the federal court was sitting. Black & White Taxicab & T. Co.
v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & T. Co., 276 U. S. 518 (1928). See Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 74 (1938). And see Parker, Erie v.
Tompkins in Retrospect: An Analysis of Its Proper Area and Limits,
35 A. B. A. J. 19, 21 (1949); Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 29 ILL. L. Rsv. 356, 362-4 (1933); Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORN. L.
Q. 499, 524-7 (1928).
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States Supreme Court gave the separate states exclusive
power, in diversity cases brought in a federal forum,
to predetermine the legal consequences to flow from
facts.
If that power may be held to comprehend
state capacity, in effect, to limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, the argument to that conclusion must
rest upon analogy between state jurisdictional statutes and
those state enactments and decisions which, by force of the
rule in Erie, a federal court admittedly must apply. 16
A state may withdraw or qualify the jurisdiction of its
courts to hear a case or to enter judgment on an admitted
cause of action for either of two reasons. The state may
have determined that because of some objection to the plaintiff or to his claim, its courts are not to be open to him at
all, or not until certain conditions are complied with. 7

Or

the state may have determined that because efficient administration of the judicial system makes such a rule necessary, wise, or convenient, the plaintiff is not to be
heard ip the state courts at all, or not until certain conditions
are complied with.18 In the one situation, withdrawal of
16. In general, as Erie principles are currently verbalized, state
statutes and decisions relating to "substance" are binding upon federal
courts in diversity cases. Those which go to "procedure" are not. See
note 20 inffra.
17. The North Carolina statute involved in Angel v. Bullington,
for example, prevented the holder of notes secured by deeds of trust
upon real property from recovering a deficiency judgment in the event
of sale of the realty. That statute has been identified as one evidencing a solicitude for the economic welfare of the state's debtorsa non-administrative measure, certainly. See Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1037,
1039 (1947).
Similarly reflective of a concern for debtors was the
New York mortgage moratorium law, which had, generally, the effect
of withdrawing from the courts of the state jurisdiction to entertain
mortgage foreclosure proceedings during the legislatively-extended redemption period. East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U. S.
230 (1945).
18. A state's determination, under principles of forum non conveniens, that its courts are inadequate to the entertainment of actions
of a certain sort should, to the extent that such a decision is one upon
entirely internal, administrative matters, bind no other judicial system.
It may be true, of course, that a federal court, the jurisdiction of
which is invoked on grounds of diversity of citizenship, will discover
that an action rejected by the state system because of inappropriateness of the forum is no less inconveniently brought before it. Dismissal of the case by the federal court in those circumstances would
result not from the federal court's application of state law, but
rather from an independent judgment respecting its own adequacy
as a forum. That the federal court might list as indicia of
inconvenience the same factors which had prompted the state system
to decline jurisdiction would be coincidental, and not indicative of the
projection of state principles of forum non conveniens into the federal
court by dint of Erie. The United States Supreme Court has not
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jurisdiction is motivated by a state policy judgment concerning the parties or the nature of the dispute between them.
In the other, the withdrawal of jurisdiction evidences the
state's conviction that, simply as a matter of administration,
its judicial system has not the time, or the money, or the
machinery to resolve the particular dispute. Declaratory of
the principle that state policy should not be subverted by
choice of a federal forum, the decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins persuades that only the first, or non-administrative
state jurisdictional enactment is to be followed by the federal courts in diversity cases. That such a jurisdictional
statute, expressive of state public policy, is closely analogous
to a state rule which creates or withholds a traditional "substantive" right is readily apparent. 9 So different from these
are the laws adopted in aid of the state's administrative machinery that only an absurd turn of reasoning could find in
Erie an attempt to compel federal compliance with the lat2

ter.

0

passed directly on whether a federal court may apply its own forum
non conveniens rules in a diversity case. In Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
330 U. S. 501 (1947), a Virginia resident brought an action in a New
York federal district court for damages allegedly caused by the negligence of a Pennsylvania corporation in the delivery of gasoline to the
plaintiff's warehouses in Virginia. The cause was dismissed by the district court because of its opinion that the New York law as to
forum non conveniens, which had the case been brought in-the New York
state courts would have compelled dismissal, applied in the federal
courts under the Erie rule. Following a reversal by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the United States Supreme Court held
that the dismissal by the district court had been proper. The Erie
premise from which the opinion in the district court had proceeded was
not, however, adopted by the Supreme Court. Rather, the majority
applied the federal rule as to the discretion of a court to employ the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, which rule, to the extent that the
case called for application of the doctrine, was considered to resemble
the New York rule so nearly as to make unprofitable an ".

.

. inquiry

as to the source from which [the federal] rule must flow." Gilbert v.
Gulf Oil Corp., supra at 509. To the same effect is language in Koster
v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 529 (1947). By
the 1948 revision of Title 28 of the United States Code, forum non
conveniens is no longer ground for dismissal of an action brought in
a federal district court. A district court may now, in its discretion,
transfer a cause to a more appropriate forum. 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a)
(1948).
19. See note 16 supra, and note 20 infra.
20. Employing the terminology of the cases which have effected
the extensions of the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, a state jurisdictional statute withdrawing jurisdiction from state courts for purely
administrative reasons would not be binding upon federal courts in
diversity cases, because such a statute is "procedural." See note 16
supra. The terms "substance" and "procedure" are unfortunate here,
for they connote the existence of a line upon one or the other side of
which any case may be placed, with the ultimate determination that
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Given the validity of the distinction drawn between the
two types of jurisdictional statutes, the crucial task of characterizing a particular statute as of one type or the other
devolves upon the federal court in which the propriety
of granting a trial on the merits is challenged. 21

Char-

acterization of a state jurisdictional statute as of the
purely administrative, non-binding type would be clearly
called for in the case of an enactment withdrawing
jurisdiction for reasons of forum non conveniens. Confronted
by such a statute, a federal court would be free to exercise
an independent judgment respecting the wisdom of entertaining suits excluded from the courts of the state by reason
of the enactment. 22

Federal divergence from state forum

non conveniens practice could be productive of none of the
mischief which the decision in Erie sought to erase. 23

It is

difficult to argue that a state's unwillingness to clutter its
dockets or to inconvenience witnesses should have any effect
on the power of a federal district court to entertain cases
brought before

it. 2 4

Not every case would be as clear.

A

state law withholding from state courts the power to entertain suits in which injunctions against labor unions were
Eiie principles apply or not dependent upon an inspection of the relation of case to line.

COOK, LOGICALAND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT

OF LAwS c. VI (1942). But see Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183,
198 (1947) (dissenting opinion). More properly, it would seem, application of the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins should be made to depend
upon an informed determination of the state's purpose as declared in
its common or statutory law. That state policy is crucial in such
cases has been recognized. See Angel v. Bullington, supra at 201 (dissenting opinion); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109
(1945); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 504 (1941). And see Note,
56 YALE L. J. 1037, 1040 n.25 (1947). Questions of jurisdiction have
been, on occasion, at least, treated as "procedural." Mr. Justice Reed,
dissenting in the Angel case, said: "In matters of procedure and jurisdiction, I take it, no one would contend that the doctrine of Erie Railroad is applicable." Angel v. Bullington, supra at 198; see Stephenson v. Grand Trunk W. R. R., 110 F.2d 401, 405 (7th Cir. 1940).
21. In any case to which the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins may
be applied, it is, of course, the federal court's classification of the
state statute or common law which is decisive. See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 758 (1st Cir. 1940).
22. See note 18 supra.
23. See note 15 supra.
24. The courts of the state of New York customarily refuse to
entertain actions upon foreign causes of action brought by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign defendants. In certain cases, something
less than complete "foreign-ness" has moved New York courts to decline jurisdiction on grounds of inconvenience. Gainer v. Donner, 140
Misc. 841, 251 N. Y. S. 713 (1931); Pietraroia v. New Jersey & H.
R. R., 197 N. Y. 434, 91 N. E. 120 (1910).

19491

NOTES

prayed might, on the one hand, be expressive of state policy
concerning the inviolability of labor's right to use its economic weapons; on the other hand, such a statute might be enunciative, merely, of the state's conviction that its judicial machinery is unsuited for the resolution of certain complex
economic problems.2 5 Although difficulties there may be, the
nature of the federal judge's inquiry is clearly indicated: He
must inform himself as to the history and purpose of the
26
state law invoked to control his action.
25. As the text suggests, problems might arise concerning the
efficacy of the "little Norris-LaGuardia" acts as limitations upon the
jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity cases. Surely each such
statute reflects not a state judgment respecting the adequacy of its
judicial machinery to handle labor cases, but rather a state policy
concerning the economic balance which ought to obtain between management and labor. See, for example, IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns,
1933) § 40-501, et seq., especially § 40-502.
26. Quite recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
passed upon a question which is near the problem in the principal
case. In Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Smith, and Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., (two cases), 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir.
1948), a minority shareholder, resident in New Jersey, commenced
in a federal district court in New Jersey a shareholder's derivative
suit against a Delaware corporation. By the terms of a New Jersey
statute having to do with derivative suits, a shareholder whose holdings
are less in value than the amount therein prescribed may be required
by the corporation in whose right the action is brought to give security
for reasonable expenses which may be incurred by the corporation in
connection with the suit. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets up entirely different rules governing the same subject.
Here, the corporation had moved in the court below for an order requiring the furnishing of security. The district court determined
that the New Jersey statute is "remedial," and therefore not binding
upon a federal court in a diversity case. In disposing of the case upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, declaring
that the statute in question was a legislative representation of important New Jersey public policy, not to be undercut by the accident
of diverse citizenship. Significant in the instant context is the method
whereby the circuit court fixed upon the proper classification of the
statute before it. Not content with the district court's identification
of the law as a "remedial" one, the circuit court went to relevant legal
and non-legal materials to determine exactly what had moved the New
Jersey legislators to the enactment of the statute. Those sources
afforded rather conclusive proof that the measure had been passed
with an eye to the prevention of losses to corporations through "strike"
suits. By way of underlining the approach of the circuit court, it
should be pointed out that the substance-procedure rubric was
abandoned as a legal tool in favor of a realistic examination into the
purposes underlying the statute, with application of Erie .principles
dependent upon the conclusions discovered by the examination. The
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Smith and
Cohen cases. 17 U. S. L. WEEK 3257 (U. S. Mar. 1, 1949). The-brief
for petitioners in the Cohen case urges the inapplicability in the Federal courts of the 'New Jersey statute. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, runs petitioners' argument, is a comprehensive
enactment regulating all phases of abuse of shareholders' suits. And
in a field totally occupied by a federal statute, state enactments are
of no effect in the federal courts under the Rules of Decision Act.
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It has been amply demonstrated in recent years that the
traditional substance-procedure distinction is an imperfect
guide to a satisfactory application of the Erie rule. The distinction developed herein between state rules embodying
policy judgments and those rules developed simply to promote the smooth functioning of the state judicial system
seems to provide an accurate analytical tool with which may
be fashioned a sound solution to any Erie problem. 27 Thus,
state statutes or decisions imposing upon tort defendants
the burden of proving contributory negligence may
be declaratory of a judgment by the state that plaintiffs
should be aided in securing redress. 28
Insofar as
the state statutes and decisions allocative of the burden of
proof are not found to be purely administrative, federal
courts should be without discretion to permit a variance
from the state-prescribed rules. On the other hand, state
rules calculated merely to expedite business in the judicial
system of the state-e.g., rules governing the printing of

briefs-should not be considered binding upon federal courts
29

in diversity cases.
This analysis is quickly dispositive of the issue in the
principal case. The court's initial inquiry should have led
it to an examination of the nature and purpose of the statute
at hand. Rather clearly, the Mississippi statute closing the
Petitioner contends, further, that since Rule 23 is characterized as
a rule of procedure, similar or conflicting state rules must also be
classified as procedural. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 13-18.
27. The distinction is, moreover, a tool useful in rationalizing all
that hitherto has been done in the name of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.
See cases cited notes 7-10 supra.
28. Professor Cook has pointed out that a statute shifting the
burden of proof may be labeled "procedural" or "substantive" dependent upon the part the statute plays in the case in which the label
is affixed. CooK, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 167, et seq. Where the
effect of such a statute is to shift the burden of proof merely as a
matter of trial convenience, the statute is termed "procedural."
Cf.
Sackheim v. Pigueron, 215 N. Y. 62, 109 N. E. 109 (1915). On the
other hand, when the burden of proving an element is laid upon the
party to whose case the point is vital, the incidence of the burden is
considered a matter of "substance."
Cf. Southern Ry. v. Prescott,
240 U. S. 632 (1915); Central V. Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507 (1914).
29. Certain state judicial practices are so patently concerned
solely with internal notions of trial convenience that any uncertainty
about their applicability in the federal courts under the Rules of Decision Act was early dispelled. See Vicksburg & M. R. R. v. Putnam,
118 U. S. 545, 553 (1886) (state rule forbidding comments on evidence
from the bench not controlling in federal courts); Nudd v. Burrows,
91 U. S. 426, 441, 442 (1875) (state rule permitting retirement of
jury with written instructions not controiling in federal courts).
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doors of the state courts to non-complying foreign corporations is founded on no determination that the Mississippi
courts are administratively inadequate to dispose of such
suits. Certainly the Mississippi statute expresses, rather, a
policy judgment to the effect that a foreign corporation not
meeting the standards prescribed by the state of Mississippi
should not be accorded the privilege of using the state's
courts.30 It was this type of determination that the Erie
case consigned to the exclusive power of Mississippi. No
independent judgment was intended to be allowed the federal court3' which should therefore have refused to entertain the case, precisely as a state court would have refused.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
A perennial dogma asserts that when a government
corporate agency appears in court it enjoys a preferred
legal status. That preference in its most extreme form denies all amenability to suit. But even if suability is
determined, preferential treatment still may be accorded by
limiting the kinds of liability to which the agency is subject,
or the burdensome incidents of suit which it would otherwise
bear. In either case the judicially-created notion of preference is rooted in the historic concept that suit does not lie

against an unconsenting sovereign.'
30. Disregard of state statutes denying access to courts of the
state to non-complying foreign corporations has been held to be subversive of a "policy [of the state] to protect [its] citizens against the
fraud and imposition of insolvent and unreliable corporations, and
to place them in an attitude to be reached by legal process from .. .
courts [of the state] in favor of citizens having cause of complaint."
Alabama W. R. R. v. Talley-Bates Const. Co., 162 Ala. 396, 50 So. 341,
342 (1909).
31. The Federal Constitution is, of course, prescriptive of the limits
beyond which a state may not go in restricting the jurisdiction of the
courts of its own system. See McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R.,
292 U. S.230, 233 (1934). Among the relevant limiting provisions are
the contracts clause, the full faith and credit clause, the privileges and
immunities clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection
clause. Obviously an unconstitutional state jurisdictional statute can
be of no effect in restricting the jurisdiction of a federal court sitting
in a diversity case.
1. Except for the constitutional denial of federal courts' jurisdiction over suits by citizens of one state against a sovereign sister
state (U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XI) the doctrine of sovereign immunity

